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From Chevron to Massachusetts:
Justice Stevens’s Approach to
Securing the Public Interest
Kathryn A. Watts∗
During the past three decades, one Supreme Court justice — John Paul
Stevens — has authored two of the most significant administrative law
decisions that speak to the judiciary’s role in checking agency
interpretations of the statutes that they administer. In Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Justice Stevens’s
landmark 1984 decision unanimously upheld the EPA’s construction of a
term found in the Clean Air Act. Subsequently, in Massachusetts v. EPA,
Justice Stevens’s 2007 opinion for a five-justice majority handed a major
win to global environmental security by ordering the EPA to reconsider its
refusal to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. Although
both decisions were written by Justice Stevens and both involved the EPA
and the Clean Air Act, the two decisions seem to send very different
messages about the judiciary’s policing function. In Chevron, the Court
embraced a highly deferential, hands-off view of the judiciary, whereas in
Massachusetts, the Court embraced a more protective, active judicial role.
In light of the seemingly divergent messages in these two decisions, this
Article assesses Justice Stevens’s position on the judiciary’s policing role
concerning agency actions that impact matters of public security, health,
safety, and welfare. This Article ultimately concludes that when Justice
Stevens’s opinions are viewed as a whole, a fairly clear picture emerges:
Justice Stevens cannot accurately be labeled as either the proponent of a
highly deferential, hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron), or the proponent of
∗
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an active judiciary (à la Massachusetts). Rather, as a strong adherent of
purposivism, Justice Stevens seeks to effectuate Congress’s own animating
goals, paying particularly close attention to Congress’s protective and
remedial purposes. Thus, although he expressly eschews deciding cases
based on his own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation often enables him to give agencies the leeway they need to
achieve Congress’s broad protective or remedial goals and conversely to
check agencies when they act counter to Congress’s purposes.
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INTRODUCTION
Administrative agencies in the United States play a wide-reaching,
pervasive role in regulating matters that impact public health, safety,
welfare, and security.1 The Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”),
for example, protects the safety, efficacy, and security of the nation’s
food and drug supply.2 Actions taken by the Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) limit threats to our air and water, as well as to the
security of our global climate.3 The Consumer Product Safety
Commission aims to “save lives and keep families safe by reducing the
risk of injuries and deaths associated with consumer products.”4 And,
as the recent financial crisis has highlighted, actions taken by a
number of agencies, such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Department of Treasury, can significantly impact our nation’s
financial security.5

1
This Article uses the term “security” broadly to include much more than simply
military or national security. See S. NEIL MACFARLANE & YUEN FOONG KHONG, HUMAN
SECURITY AND THE UN: A CRITICAL HISTORY 1 (2006) (discussing how in last 20 years of
20th century, concept of “security” has expanded beyond its traditional focus on
national or state security and has “expanded horizontally beyond military issues to
take into account others, such as economy, environment, health, gender, and culture,
in context of expansion of core values to include welfare and identity”); see also id. at
12 (noting that “[m]ost would agree that military affairs are intrinsically linked to
notion of security” but that term “security” now implies much broader meaning);
Emma Rothschild, What Is Security?, DAEDALUS, Summer 1995, at 53, 55 (discussing
how concept of security has broadened from military issues to also cover “political,
economic, social, environmental, or ‘human’ security”).
2
See U.S. Food and Drug Administration, FDA’s Mission Statement,
http://www.fda.gov/opacom/morechoices/mission.html (last visited May 28, 2009)
(“The FDA is responsible for protecting the public health by assuring the safety,
efficacy, and security of human and veterinary drugs, biological products, medical
devices, our nation’s food supply, cosmetics, and products that emit radiation.”).
3
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 505 (2007) (noting that petitioners
seeking certiorari called global warming “the most pressing environmental challenge
of our time”); see also Examining the Case for the California Waiver: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Clean Air and Nuclear Safety of the S. Comm. on Env’t and Pub. Works,
110th Cong. 27 (2007) (testimony of Edmund G. Brown, Jr., Att’y Gen. of Cal.)
(“Global warming is the most important environmental and public health issue we
face today.”).
4
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.cpsc.gov/about/faq.html (last visited May 28, 2009).
5
See generally Kevin G. Hall & Margaret Talev, Obama to Financial Sector: More
Regulation Is Coming, NEWS & OBSERVER, Dec. 18, 2008, at 1A (discussing how
regulatory agencies and their weak regulatory approaches have been blamed for
economic crisis).
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Given administrative agencies’ pervasive powers over matters that
impact the public’s health, security, and welfare, it is not surprising
that much of administrative law seeks to define the proper boundaries
of agency action and how agency action will be policed. Of particular
importance is the judiciary’s role in policing agency constructions of
enabling legislation. For example, what role should the judiciary play
in evaluating the EPA’s determination that it lacks the authority to
regulate certain emissions that lead to global warming because the
emissions, according to the EPA, fall outside the reach of the term “air
pollutant” as it is used within the Clean Air Act (“CAA”)?6 Similarly,
what role should the courts play in reviewing the FDA’s legal
conclusion that tobacco products — a major killer in the United States
— can be regulated within the meaning of the Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act?7
During the past three decades, one Supreme Court Justice, John
Paul Stevens, has authored two of the most significant administrative
law decisions that address the judiciary’s role in checking
administrative agencies’ statutory interpretations. In 1984, in Chevron
U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., Justice Stevens
wrote a unanimous opinion for the Court, upholding the EPA’s
construction of the term “stationary source” found in the CAA, despite
environmentalists’ claims that the EPA’s interpretation would fail to
clean up air pollution.8 Subsequently, in Massachusetts v. EPA, Justice
Stevens authored an opinion in 2007 for a five-justice majority
ordering the EPA to reconsider its refusal to regulate greenhouse gases
under the CAA, thus handing a major win to global environmental
security.9 Today, Chevron stands as a landmark decision because it
6
Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 (holding in split 5−4 decision that EPA has
statutory authority to regulate certain emissions that lead to global warming).
7
Cf. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000) (holding
in split 5−4 decision that FDA lacks statutory authority to regulate tobacco products).
8
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42
(1984). For an excellent history and discussion of the Chevron decision, see generally
Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (chronicling Chevron’s
creation).
9
See generally Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 497 (sending EPA back to drawing
board to reconsider whether to regulate certain greenhouse gas emissions).
Highlighting the significance of the case, one scholar has said that Massachusetts was
an “enormous, if narrow, victory for environmentalists: it legitimized their concerns
about global warming and their claims that the administration was not doing what it
should to address it.” Jonathan Z. Cannon, The Significance of Massachusetts v. EPA,
93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 53, 53 (2007) [hereinafter Cannon, Significance], available at
http://www.virginialawreview.org/inbrief/2007/05/21/cannon.pdf.
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erected what is now known as Chevron deference, which calls for
deference to certain agency constructions of ambiguous statutory
terms.10 Massachusetts similarly serves as a highly significant decision
because it made major inroads in administrative law doctrine and also
because it addressed a major social issue — global warming.11
Although Justice Stevens wrote both decisions and each involved the
EPA and the CAA, Chevron and Massachusetts seem to send very
different messages about the judiciary’s policing function. In Chevron,
the Court embraced a highly deferential, hands-off view of the
judiciary in handing a win to the Reagan Administration’s EPA and a
loss to environmentalists. In contrast, in Massachusetts, the Court
embraced a much more active judicial role in handing a win to global
environmental security and a loss to the Bush Administration’s EPA.
Thus, as one scholar has commented, “[b]oth in tone and substance,
Justice Stevens’s [Massachusetts] opinion looks like his Chevron
opinion turned inside out.”12
In light of the seemingly divergent messages that Massachusetts and
Chevron send, this Article assesses Justice Stevens’s position on the
judiciary’s role in policing administrative action. Does Justice Stevens
stand as the proponent of a hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron), or as an
advocate of a more active, protective judiciary (à la Massachusetts)?
More specifically, what is Justice Stevens’s approach when it comes to
policing statutory interpretations issued by agencies that impact the
public interest?13 Is there anything unique about his judicial approach
10

See infra Part I.A.
See Kathryn A. Watts & Amy J. Wildermuth, Massachusetts v. EPA: Breaking
New Ground on Issues Other than Global Warming, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 1029, 1030
(2007) (discussing legal significance of case); see also Cannon, Significance, supra note
9, at 61-62 (noting that decision provides “rallying point for climate changes
advocates” and that it may be as close to “Brown v. Board of Education for the
environment” as we will ever come).
12
Ronald A. Cass, Massachusetts v. EPA: The Inconvenient Truth About Precedent,
93 VA. L. REV. (IN BRIEF) 75, 84 (2007), available at http://www.virginialawreview.org/
inbrief/2007/05/21/cass.pdf.
13
The phrase “public interest,” which was commonly used in New Deal-era
legislation, is often used by Congress in describing the boundaries of legislative
delegations to agencies, as well as by agencies when they seek to justify their actions.
See Paul R. Verkuil, Understanding the “Public Interest” Justification for Government
Actions, 39 ACTA JURIDICA HUNGARICA 141, 141-150 (1998) (“The words ‘public
interest’ are probably invoked more than any other to explain and justify government
action, whether in delegations of legislative authority to agencies or in explanations by
agency officials to the public.”). The phrase is concededly broad and amorphous. See
id. at 141 (noting that words “public interest” are “rarely self-actualizing” and that “in
some cases they seem virtually devoid of meaning”). However, “the courts have
accepted it as a delegable standard to agencies.” Id. at 150. This Article seeks to
11
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that enables him to provide particular judicial protection when
matters of public security, health, safety, or welfare are involved?14
In answering these questions, this Article reviews various opinions
authored by Justice Stevens which, like Massachusetts and Chevron,
involve the reasonableness of agencies’ statutory interpretations. This
Article contends that, when Justice Stevens’s opinions are viewed as a
whole, a fairly clear picture emerges: Justice Stevens cannot accurately
be labeled as either the proponent of a highly deferential, hands-off
judiciary or the proponent of an active, robust judiciary. Rather, as a
strong adherent of interpretive purposivism,15 Justice Stevens pays
particularly close attention to Congress’s own protective and remedial
purposes, such as the protection of workers from discrimination or the
protection of the integrity of animal species, air, and waters. As a
result, although Justice Stevens expressly eschews deciding cases
based on his own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to
explore how Justice Stevens uses judicial review to ensure that agency action can be
described as serving the “public interest.” In other words, what role does judicial
review play in helping to check agency action and to ensure that it serves the public
interest?
14
Although the two primary cases analyzed in this Article, Massachusetts and
Chevron, involve environmental issues, this Article does not focus solely on
environmental issues, but rather looks broadly at decisions written by Justice Stevens
that involve agency action that can be said to touch in some way on matters of public
security, health, safety, or welfare. In other words, this Article looks at Justice Stevens’s
decisions involving a broad range of agency action, not just environmental action.
15
Justice Stevens repeatedly has made clear that he believes that “[s]tatutes
should be construed in a manner consistent with their underlying policies and
purposes.” Sec’y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 357 (1984) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting); see also Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 551 U.S.
644, 693 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that “judges must always remain
faithful to the intent of the legislature”); Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ.,
550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007) (“The only ‘policy’ by which I have been driven is that which
this Court has endorsed on repeated occasions regarding the importance of remaining
faithful to Congress’ intent.”); Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, Inc., 458 U.S. 564, 577
(1982) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“In final analysis, any question of statutory
construction requires the judge to decide how the legislature intended its enactment
to apply to the case at hand.”). Accordingly, he is viewed as the leading champion of
purposivism on the Court today. See generally Abner S. Greene, The Missing Step of
Textualism, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1913, 1913 (2006) (“Throughout his more than thirty
years on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice John Paul Stevens has been a consistent
proponent of a purposive, as opposed to textualist, brand of statutory
interpretation.”); John F. Manning, Competing Presumptions About Statutory Coherence,
74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2009, 2009 (2006) (“For some time now, Justice Stevens has been
the Court’s most vocal and, I believe, the ablest defender of what two generations of
judges and lawyers took to be the post-New Deal consensus on statutory
interpretation: the idea that legislation is a purposivist act, and that judges should
interpret acts of Congress to implement the legislative purpose . . . .”).
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statutory interpretation often enables him to facilitate Congress’s
broad protective goals. In particular, Justice Stevens often either
explicitly or implicitly draws upon the “remedial purpose” canon,
which provides that protective and remedial statutes should be
construed liberally rather than narrowly to effectuate their beneficial
goals and purposes.16
By giving a broad reading to Congress’s protective and remedial
goals and purposes, Justice Stevens’s approach to statutory
interpretation appears to give agencies the deference they need to
achieve Congress’s goals, and conversely, to check agencies when they
act counter to Congress’s protective or remedial purposes. This means
that if an agency adopts a cramped reading of a statute that Congress
intended to serve broad protective or remedial goals, Justice Stevens
may refuse to defer to the agency’s views. For example, in
Massachusetts, Justice Stevens refused to defer to the EPA when it
interpreted the CAA narrowly to foreclose the regulation of certain
greenhouse gases that lead to global warming.17 Conversely, if an
agency adopts an expansive statutory reading that helps to further
Congress’s broad protective or remedial purposes, Justice Stevens
often will give deference to the agency’s views. For example, in his
dissent in Rapanos v. United States,18 he argued that Congress’s broad
goal of “protecting the physical, chemical and biological integrity of
our waters” supported the Army Corps of Engineers’ determination
that certain wetlands fell within the reach of the Clean Water Act
(“CWA”).19
This Article will proceed in three parts. Part I details Justice
Stevens’s landmark opinions in Chevron and Massachusetts and
discusses how these two decisions seem to offer two competing views
of the judicial role: one that is highly deferential and another that
envisions a much more active and protective judicial role. Part II then
explores whether the apparent differences between Massachusetts and
Chevron can be reconciled. It ultimately concludes that the cases’
differing approaches and tones can be reconciled when considered in
16
See generally Blake A. Watson, Liberal Construction of CERCLA Under the
Remedial Purpose Canon, 20 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 199, 201 (1996) (describing how
remedial purpose canon of statutory construction “states that remedial legislation
should be liberally construed in order to effectuate the beneficial purpose for which it
was enacted”).
17
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 527-29 (2007) (rejecting EPA’s contention
that certain emissions from new motor vehicles are not “air pollutants” within
meaning of CAA).
18
547 U.S. 715 (2006).
19
Id. at 799 n.8 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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light of Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to purposivism, which
calls upon him to construe different statutory provisions in light of
Congress’ animating goals and purposes. Finally, Part III describes
how Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach to statutory interpretation,
which often relies upon the remedial purpose canon, enables him
either to give agencies the deference that they need to resolve statutory
ambiguities in favor of the remedial or protective purposes that the
statute was designed to protect, or conversely, to check agencies when
they act counter to those purposes.
I.

CHEVRON AND MASSACHUSETTS: ONE AUTHOR, TWO VOICES

During his time on the Court, Justice Stevens has penned two of the
most significant opinions that speak to the proper role of the judiciary
in overseeing agencies’ statutory interpretations: Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.20 and Massachusetts v. EPA.21
However, rather than fitting together to tell a coherent story of the
proper judicial role in the regulatory arena, these two opinions seem,
at least on their surface, to point in opposite directions.
A. Chevron: A Win for Judicial Deference, a Loss for Environmental
Interests
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Chevron stands today as a landmark
decision, providing the Court’s most significant pronouncement on
the allocation of interpretive power between courts and agencies.22 In
its mere twenty-five years of life, Chevron has spawned voluminous
scholarly commentary.23 It also has been cited in more than 10,000
20

467 U.S. 837 (1984).
549 U.S. 497 (2007).
22
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 399 (noting that Chevron provides “leading
statement about the division of authority between agencies and courts in interpreting
statutes”).
23
See, e.g., David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine,
2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201; Elizabeth Garrett, Legislating Chevron, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2637 (2003); Michael Herz, Deference Running Riot: Separating Interpretation and
Lawmaking under Chevron, 6 ADMIN. L.J. AM. U. 187 (1992); Thomas W. Merrill &
Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833 (2001); Thomas W. Merrill
& Kathryn Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116
HARV. L. REV. 467 (2002); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative
Interpretations of Law, 1989 DUKE L.J. 511; Mark Seidenfeld, A Syncopated Chevron:
Emphasizing Reasoned Decisionmaking in Reviewing Agency Interpretations of Statutes,
73 TEX. L. REV. 83 (1994); Cass R. Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
COLUM. L. REV. 2071 (1990); Kathryn A. Watts, Adapting to Administrative Law’s Erie
Doctrine, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 997 (2007) [hereinafter Watts, Adapting]. Faced with this
21
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judicial opinions,24 easily surpassing famous cases such as Marbury v.
Madison25 and Roe v. Wade26 in the number of subsequent citations to
them. It also is quickly catching up to Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.27
Chevron’s landmark status is a bit ironic given that Justice Stevens did
not expect the case to become a bestseller.28 Nor did he think that he
was breaking new doctrinal ground when he wrote the opinion for the
Court.29 In fact, as Professor Thomas Merrill has detailed, at the time
Chevron was briefed, argued, and decided, the case was widely viewed
as a routine but complex case turning on a technical statutory issue
involving the CAA.30
At issue in Chevron was the meaning of one specific phrase found in
the CAA Amendments of 1977 — the phrase “stationary source.”31
The 1977 amendments contained various requirements applicable to
states that had failed to achieve national air quality standards.32 The
amendments required these states, called “nonattainment” states, to
establish permit programs that would regulate “new or modified major

outpouring of scholarly attention, Justice Stevens has commented that the “opinion
has been the subject of more scholarly comment than it really deserves.” John Paul
Stevens, Random Recollections, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 269, 279 (2005) [hereinafter
Stevens, Random Recollections].
24
According to a recent search using Westlaw’s KeyCite, 10,463 judicial opinions
cite Chevron. Online search for 467 U.S. 837, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).
25
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Marbury has been cited in some 3,331 judicial
opinions. Online search for 5 U.S. 137, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).
26
410 U.S. 113 (1973). Roe has been cited in some 3,580 judicial opinions. Online
search for 410 U.S. 113, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).
27
304 U.S. 64 (1938). Erie has been cited in 13,144 judicial opinions. Online
search for 304 U.S. 64, Westlaw (May 15, 2009).
28
See generally Kenneth A. Manaster, Justice Stevens, Judicial Power, and the
Varieties of Environmental Litigation, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1963, 1999 (2006) (“Stevens
himself did not consider his statement [in Chevron] as new in any respect, and he
explicitly relied on numerous precedents to support his synthesis of analytic steps in
judicial review.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 188 (2006)
[hereinafter Sunstein, Step Zero] (“Ironically, Justice Stevens, the author of Chevron,
had no broad ambitions for the decision; the Court did not mean to do anything
dramatic.”).
29
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 420 n.76 (describing how Justice Stevens has
publicly stated that he viewed Chevron as simple restatement of established law); see
also Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1170-71 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes they
administer was not born in Chevron . . . .”).
30
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 412-20.
31
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 839-40
(1984) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)).
32
Id.
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stationary sources” of air pollution.33 In October 1981, the Reagan
Administration’s EPA implemented the permit requirement by
promulgating a regulation that allowed states to adopt a “plant-wide”
definition of the term “stationary source.”34 This definition meant that
states could treat all pollution-emitting devices within the same
industrial group as if they were encased within a “bubble.” In other
words, under the EPA’s regulation, “an existing plant that contains
several pollution-emitting devices [could] install or modify one piece
of equipment without meeting the permit conditions if the alteration
[would] not increase the total emissions from the plant.”35
After the EPA adopted its plant-wide definition, various
environmental groups, including the National Resources Defense
Council, Inc. and Citizens for a Better Environment, Inc., filed a
petition for review in the D.C. Circuit seeking to set aside the EPA’s
regulations.36 These groups objected to the EPA’s interpretation. They
believed that the bubble concept would fail to improve air quality and
would have the effect of locking in the status quo because plants
would not be required to implement new pollution control technology
so long as overall emissions within the plant did not increase.37 The
D.C. Circuit ultimately agreed that the EPA’s regulations should be set
aside, reasoning based on two of its prior precedents that the bubble
concept was inappropriate in the context of a permit program that was
designed to improve as opposed to merely maintain air quality.38 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari.39
After the Court heard oral argument, the Justices were initially
divided: Chief Justice Burger and Justices Brennan and O’Connor
voted to affirm, whereas Justices White, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Powell tentatively voted to reverse.40 Justices Marshall and Rehnquist
did not participate in the decision, and Justice O’Connor ultimately
also recused herself.41 Because Justice White was the senior Justice in
33

Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7502(b)(6) (1982)) (emphasis added).
Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans
and Approval and Promulgation of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50,766 (Oct.
14, 1981).
35
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
36
See id. at 841 n.3.
37
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 403.
38
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Gorsuch, 685 F.2d 718, 720 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
39
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 461 U.S. 956 (1983).
40
See John Paul Stevens, In Memoriam: Byron R. White, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1, 2
(2002) [hereinafter Stevens, In Memoriam]; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at 415-16.
41
See Stevens, In Memoriam, supra note 40, at 2; see also Merrill, supra note 8, at
415-19.
34
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the majority, he was charged with assigning the writing of the opinion,
and he chose to assign the opinion to Justice Stevens.42 Justice Stevens
ultimately crafted an opinion joined by all participating Justices that
upheld the EPA’s regulations.43
The first paragraph of Justice Stevens’s opinion struck a reserved,
nonjudgmental tone.44 It was devoid of any discussion of the
magnitude of the social issue involved, merely highlighting the
technical complexities of the case by summarizing the statutory
amendments and the specific statutory term at issue. In addition, the
opening paragraph summarized the question presented in the case in a
way that emphasized the Court’s narrow judicial role: “The question
presented by these cases is whether the EPA’s decision to allow States
to treat all of the pollution-emitting devices within the same industrial
grouping as though they were encased within a single ‘bubble’ is based
on a reasonable construction of the statutory term ‘stationary
source.’ ”45
Justice Stevens’s embrace of a deferential, narrow judicial role in
Chevron is now best known as the Chevron “two step,” which he
articulated in the following passage:
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute
which it administers, it is confronted with two questions.
First, always, is the question whether Congress has directly
spoken to the precise question at issue. If the intent of
Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as
well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court
determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own
construction on the statute, as would be necessary in the
absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,

42
See Stevens, In Memoriam, supra note 40, at 2 (“Byron was therefore the senior
Justice in the majority, and he assigned the opinion to me.”); see also id. at 2 n.9
(noting his gratitude to Justice White for assignment); Stevens, Random Recollections,
supra note 23, at 279 (“I have always been grateful to Byron for asking me to write it.”).
43
Justice Stevens has commented that he is “sure that it was [his] thorough
analysis of the facts, rather than any comment on the deference to be accorded to the
agency, that persuaded both [Burger and Brennan] to switch sides and give [him] a
unanimous Court.” Stevens, Random Recollections, supra note 23, at 279.
44
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 840.
45
Id. at 840 (emphasis added).
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the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.46
As this passage explains, the first step of the inquiry asks whether
Congress’s “intent” is clear — an inquiry that Justice Stevens said can
be determined using traditional tools of statutory construction.47
Assuming that Congress’s intent is not clear, then the second step asks
whether the agency’s resolution of any ambiguity in the statute is a
reasonable reading, not whether it is the Court’s own preferred
reading. Thus, the judicial role envisioned in the second step is quite
limited because courts must defer to reasonable agency constructions
and cannot simply substitute their own preferred statutory readings.48
Applying this two-step inquiry to the facts at issue in Chevron,
Justice Stevens concluded at step one that Congress did not have a
specific intent as to the meaning of the term “stationary source.” A
clear answer concerning the propriety of the bubble concept was not
provided by the actual statutory text, the legislative history, or the two
main purposes surrounding the permit program: (1) an economic
interest in permitting capital improvements to continue, and (2) an
environmental interest in improving air quality.49 This led Justice
Stevens to conclude at step two that the EPA’s reading of the statutory
ambiguity was permissible. He emphasized that the permit program
sought to navigate two competing policies. The EPA’s construction,
according to Justice Stevens, represented “a reasonable
accommodation of manifestly competing interests.”50

46

Id. at 842-43.
See id. at 843 n.9. Although Justice Stevens framed the question in Chevron in
terms of the clarity of Congress’s intent, Justice Scalia, the Court’s leading textualist,
has framed the question in terms of whether the statute is clear rather than whether
Congress’s intent is clear. See generally Linda Jellum, Chevron’s Demise: A Survey of
Chevron from Infancy to Senescence, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 725, 748-53 (2007) (discussing
debate about whether step one is search for congressional intent or search for textual
clarity and noting that Scalia has been champion of textualist approach to Chevron).
48
After Chevron was handed down, scholars widely debated the basis for Chevron’s
mandatory rule of deference — some viewing it as hinging on quasi-separation of
powers principles and others arguing that it rested on notions of congressional
delegation. See generally Watts, Adapting, supra note 23, at 1005-06 (discussing how
Chevron’s basis was widely debated for years). The Supreme Court recently provided
an answer, clarifying that Chevron does rest on notions of congressional delegation,
which means that Chevron applies only when Congress delegated power to the agency
to act with the force and effect of law. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218,
229-32 (2001).
49
Chevron, 476 U.S. at 859-63.
50
Id. at 865.
47
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As Justice Stevens explained, whether the Court would have selected
the same reading of the statute if left to its own devices was irrelevant
because the judicial task is not to resolve “the struggle between
competing views of the public interest” but rather to defer to
legislators and administrators who are politically accountable for their
policy decisions.51 Relying upon democratic theory, Justice Stevens
stated:
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political
interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ personal policy
preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has
delegated policy-making responsibility may, within the limits
of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent
administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments.
While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this
political branch of the Government to make such policy
choices — resolving the competing interests which Congress
itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left
to be resolved by an agency charged with the administration of
the statute in light of everyday realities.
When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory
provision, fairly conceptualized, really centers on the wisdom
of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must
fail. In such a case, federal judges — who have no
constituency — have a duty to respect legitimate policy
choices made by those who do.52
In this passage, Justice Stevens clearly articulated his view that when
Congress has given an agency the power to fill statutory gaps, judges
should respect the choices made by those agency officials who are
more politically accountable than courts.53
B. Massachusetts: A Loss for Judicial Deference, a Win for Global
Environmental Security
Approximately two decades after Justice Stevens wrote Chevron, he
authored yet another major opinion for the Court that also involved

51
52
53

Id. at 865-66.
Id.
Id. at 865.
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the EPA, the CAA, and statutory construction: Massachusetts v. EPA.54
Unlike his Chevron opinion, however, Justice Stevens’s opinion in
Massachusetts did not defer to the policy choices made by the EPA.
Massachusetts involved the EPA’s denial of a rulemaking petition
requesting that the EPA regulate certain motor vehicle emissions,
including carbon dioxide, under section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. That
section provides that the EPA Administrator “shall by regulation
prescribe” standards applicable to the emission of “air pollutants”
from new motor vehicles, “which in his judgment cause, or contribute
to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger
public health or welfare.”55 The rulemaking petition at issue in
Massachusetts was filed in October 1999 by a group of nineteen private
organizations, including Friends of the Earth and Greenpeace USA,
which requested that the EPA regulate greenhouse gas emissions from
new motor vehicles that lead to global warming.56 Years later, in 2003
during the Bush Administration, the EPA denied the rulemaking
petition on two grounds. First, the EPA concluded that greenhouse
gases were not “air pollutants” within the meaning of the Act and that
it therefore lacked the statutory authority to regulate.57 Second, even if
it did have the legal authority to act, the EPA concluded that it was
justified in its refusal to regulate because of a long list of policy
considerations that advised against regulation at that time. Some of the
specific policy considerations that the EPA relied on included its
desire to avoid piecemeal regulation, its concerns about scientific
uncertainty, and its desire to avoid interfering with the President’s
foreign policy initiatives.58
After the EPA denied the rulemaking petition, various states, cities,
and environmental organizations sought review in the D.C. Circuit,

54
549 U.S. 497 (2007). Many scholars have already noted the significance of the
decision. See, e.g., Cannon, Significance, supra note 9, at 61-62 (discussing
environmental importance of opinion); Cass, supra note 12 (asserting that Justices’
political inclination colored outcome of decision); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note
11, at 1029 (discussing legal significance of opinion); see also Robert V. Percival,
Massachusetts v. EPA: Escaping the Common Law’s Growing Shadow, 2007 SUP. CT.
REV. 111, 160 (noting that decision is “truly remarkable”).
55
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006).
56
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 510.
57
Notice of Denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. 52,922, 52,925-29 (Sept. 8, 2003); see
also Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 511-12.
58
Notice of denial of Petition for Rulemaking, Control of Emissions from New
Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52,929-31; see also Massachusetts, 549
U.S. at 511-12.
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where a three-judge panel splintered three ways.59 Judge Randolph
ducked a tricky Article III standing issue raised in the case and
concluded that even if the EPA had the statutory authority to regulate,
the EPA had acted permissibly in declining to regulate for policy
reasons.60 Judge Sentelle would have decided the case on Article III
standing grounds, concluding that no concrete or particularized injury
was present in the case because global warming presents a generalized
injury suffered by all.61 And Judge Tatel would have ruled against the
EPA, concluding that petitioners had standing, that the EPA had the
statutory authority to regulate, and that the EPA’s discretionary
reasons for declining to regulate were not adequate.62
When the Supreme Court reviewed the case, it did not fare much
better than the D.C. Circuit in terms of speaking with a unified voice.
Rather, the Court split 5−4, with Justice Stevens writing the majority
opinion, echoing in large part Judge Tatel’s dissent below.63 In contrast
to his opinion in Chevron, which began with a highly deferential tone
devoid of substantive judgments about the underlying environmental
issues, Justice Stevens’ opinion in Massachusetts began with a lengthy
discussion of the history, the dangers, and the significance of global
warming.64 Specifically, the first paragraph of his opinion described
the issue of global warming as follows:
A well-documented rise in global temperatures has coincided
with a significant increase in the concentration of carbon
dioxide in the atmosphere. Respected scientists believe the two
trends are related. For when carbon dioxide is released into
the atmosphere, it acts like the ceiling of a greenhouse,
trapping solar energy and retarding the escape of reflected
59

Massachusetts v. EPA, 415 F.3d 50 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
Id. at 285-90 (Randolph, J., announcing judgment of court and filing opinion).
61
Id. at 291 (Sentelle, J., dissenting in part and concurring in judgment).
62
Id. at 293-94 (Tatel, J., dissenting).
63
Justice Stevens was joined in the majority opinion by Justices Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg and Breyer. Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion joined by
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito in which he argued that Article III standing was
lacking in the case. In addition, Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Thomas and Alito, in which he argued
that the EPA’s denial of the rulemaking petition should be upheld on the merits.
64
See generally Cass, supra note 12, at 76 (“By the end of the first paragraph,
readers understand that — no matter what obstacles stand in the way — this decision
is going to command the Bush administration’s environmental decisionmakers to do
what a Gore administration’s more eco-friendly administrators surely would have
done: take steps to order automobile makers to cut back on the emissions that
‘[r]espected scientists’ connect to global warming.”).
60
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heat. It is therefore a species — the most important species —
of a greenhouse gas.65
He then stated that global warming had been called “the most pressing
environmental challenge of our time.”66 In this sense, the Court made
clear at the outset that it was acutely aware of what it called the
“unusual importance of the underlying issue” of global warming.67
After Justice Stevens concluded that Article III standing
requirements were met in the case, he turned to the merits,68 first
addressing the question of whether the CAA authorizes the EPA to
regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles. He fairly
quickly rejected the EPA’s conclusion that carbon dioxide and other
greenhouse gases are not “air pollutants” within the meaning of
section 202(a)(1) of the CAA. In rejecting the EPA’s narrow definition
of the statutory term, Justice Stevens concluded that the statute was
unambiguous. The CAA included a “sweeping” and “capacious”
definition of the term “air pollutant,” expressly defining an “air
pollutant” as including “any air pollution agent or combination of
such agents, including any physical, chemical . . . substance or matter
which is emitted into or otherwise enters the ambient air.”69 Justice
Stevens acknowledged that the Congress that initially drafted section
202(a)(1) may not have “appreciated the possibility that burning fossil
fuels could lead to global warming,” but he noted that Congress’s use
65

Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 504-05 (2007).
Id.
67
Id. at 505-06 (noting that Court had granted certiorari notwithstanding serious
jurisdictional arguments involving standing and notwithstanding absence of any
circuit splits because of “unusual importance of the underlying issue” involved in
case); see also Cannon, Significance, supra note 9, at 56 (“If we assume that the Court
uses the first page of an opinion to tell us what is most important about the case, the
most important thing in this case is that anthropogenic climate change is real and very
serious.”).
68
Before turning to the merits of the case, Justice Stevens first had to deal with the
question of whether Article III standing existed in the case. He ultimately concluded
that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts — which deserved “special solicitude” in
the standing analysis due to its status as a state — had standing because a rise in sea
levels associated with global warming had already harmed and would continue to
harm Massachusetts, which owned coastal land. See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 518-26.
For discussion of Massachusetts’ handling of the Article III standing issue, see
generally Dru Stevenson, Special Solicitude for State Standing: Massachusetts v. EPA,
112 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1 (2007) (discussing how Court erected new rule giving states
special solicitude in Article III standing context); Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 11
(analyzing significance of Court’s standing analysis); Amy J. Wildermuth, Why State
Standing in Massachusetts v. EPA Matters, 27 J. LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 273
(2007) (same).
69
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 555-56 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7602(g) (2006)).
66
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of “broad language” indicated Congress’s intentional effort to ensure
regulatory flexibility so that “changing circumstances and scientific
developments” would not render the CAA obsolete.70 Because
greenhouse gases “fit well within the Clean Air Act’s capacious
definition of ‘air pollutant,’ ” Justice Stevens held that the EPA indeed
had the statutory authority to regulate.71
In reaching this conclusion, Justice Stevens arguably did little more
than apply step one of Chevron. He ultimately concluded in light of
Congress’s use of broad statutory language that in this instance, unlike
in Chevron, Congress had a specific intent on the statutory question at
issue. Whether Justice Stevens’s ultimate conclusion about the clarity
of Congress’s intent was correct,72 Justice Stevens’s opinion on the
statutory authority issue remained true to the legal framework set
forth in Chevron to the extent that it purported to assess whether or
not Congress’s intent was clear.
The same, however, cannot be said about the next portion of Justice
Stevens’s opinion, which considered the propriety of the EPA’s
reliance upon various policy concerns in declining to make a
“judgment” regarding whether greenhouse gases endanger the public
health and welfare. In declining to make a judgment, the EPA
interpreted section 202(a)(1), which states that the EPA administrator
shall regulate emissions “which in his judgment cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.”73 The EPA read the statute’s use of the term
“judgment” as providing it with the discretion to decline to make a
judgment for policy reasons, such as concerns about scientific
uncertainty and a desire to avoid stepping on the President’s toes in
the foreign realm.
In rejecting all of the EPA’s policy justifications, Justice Stevens
reasoned that the EPA’s “laundry list” of reasons for not regulating
was “divorced from the statutory text.”74 In other words, the EPA was
required to “ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute.”75
According to Justice Stevens:

70

Id. at 532-35.
Id. at 532.
72
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito and Chief Justice Roberts did not find the
statute to be unambiguous but rather felt that they were faced with “textual
ambiguity.” Id. at 557-58 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
73
42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006) (emphasis added).
74
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 531-34 (emphasis added).
75
Id. at 535.
71
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While the statute does condition the exercise of the EPA’s
authority on its formation of a “judgment,” that judgment
must relate to whether an air pollutant “cause[s], or
contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be
anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” Put another
way, the use of the word “judgment” is not a roving license to
ignore the statutory text. It is but a direction to exercise
discretion within defined statutory limits.76
Here, Justice Stevens made clear that he read the statute to require the
EPA to ground its reasons for action or inaction in the statute, not in
broader policy considerations outside of the four corners of the
statute.77
As Justice Scalia pointed out in his dissenting opinion, one difficulty
with Justice Stevens’s reasoning is that the relevant statutory text
makes it quite clear that when the EPA administrator actually “makes a
judgment whether to regulate greenhouse gases, that judgment must
relate to whether they are air pollutants that ‘cause, or contribute to,
air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public
health or welfare.’ ”78 But the statute “says nothing at all about the
reasons for which the Administrator may defer making a judgment.”79
Although this congressional silence would seem to call for Chevron
deference to the agency’s own reasonable interpretation of what
constitutes an appropriate decisional factor, Justice Stevens’s opinion
for the Court never explained why the EPA’s interpretation of the
statutory term “judgment” did not deserve deference under Chevron.80
It is here that Justice Stevens’s opinion diverges most dramatically
from Chevron’s legal framework. Instead of giving the EPA room to
make policy judgments in the face of statutory silence and ambiguity,
Justice Stevens seemed to scold the EPA for relying on policy concerns
when the statutory text said nothing about what types of extra

76

Id. at 532-33 (citation omitted).
See generally Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA: From
Politics to Expertise, 2007 S. CT. REV. 51, 80 (explaining that Court determined that
relevant statutory factors were scientific and causal and that they did “not include
broader considerations of foreign affairs and public policy”).
78
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Freeman &
Vermeule, supra note 77, at 84 (describing how Justice Scalia “excoriated the majority
for collapsing” question of what statutory factors constrain making of judgment with
question of what factors constrain agency’s decision not to make such judgment in
first place).
79
Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 552 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
80
See id. at 552-53.
77
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statutory factors the EPA could consider in declining to a make a
judgment.81
C. Contrasting Chevron and Massachusetts
When comparing Chevron and Massachusetts, the differences seem
to far outweigh the similarities. Although both Chevron and
Massachusetts involved major environmental issues of their eras and
both involved the EPA, the CAA, and issues of statutory
interpretation, the opinions look in many ways like ships passing in
the night in terms of their outcomes, their substance, and their tones.
In particular, the winners and losers in the cases differ. Chevron
handed a win to the Reagan Administration’s EPA and a loss to the
environmental groups challenging the EPA’s interpretation, whereas
Massachusetts handed a loss to the Bush Administration’s EPA and a
major win to global environmental security. The opinions also differ
dramatically in tone. Chevron struck a reserved tone that highlighted
the technical complexities involved, whereas Massachusetts used a
much more searching, critical tone that played up the monumental
significance of global warming.82 Finally, the opinions differ
substantively in terms of the role that the Court played. Chevron
embraced a type of “counter-Marbury” that envisions judicial
restraint,83 whereas Massachusetts seems to embrace a more searching
and active judiciary. Of course, the irony of all this is that the work of
one man, Stevens, could be cited by litigants seeking a deferential,
81
For a general discussion of the role Massachusetts might play in speaking to the
issue of what kinds of extrastatuory factors agencies can take into account when
making decisions, see Richard J. Pierce, What Factors Can an Agency Consider in
Making a Decision?, 2009 MICH. ST. L. REV. 67, 81 (“I have no doubt that many
petitioners will argue that Massachusetts . . . stand[s] for the proposition that
congressional silence with respect to a decisional factor should be interpreted as
congressional rejection of that factor and as a prohibition on agency consideration of
that factor in making decisions.”); see also Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for
Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 50-52 (2009) (discussing
how Massachusetts could be read to limit types of extrastatutory factors that agencies
consider but arguing that this is not best reading of Massachusetts).
82
See Cass, supra note 12, at 82 (arguing that Court in Massachusetts “put on the
mantle of climatologists-in-chief, second-guessing every consideration that supports
the positions taken by the EPA”).
83
See, e.g., Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 189 (arguing that Chevron went
“so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury”); see also Richard W. Murphy, A “New”
Counter-Marbury: Reconciling Skidmore Deference and Agency Interpretive Freedom, 56
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 37 (2004) (noting “tension between the Marbury norm that [courts]
control legal meaning and the Chevron norm that agencies control policymaking,
which in turn, sometimes controls legal meaning”).
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restrained judiciary as well as by litigants seeking a more active and
protective judiciary. This leaves one wondering whether there is some
explanation for these seemingly inconsistent decisions.
II.

RECONCILING CHEVRON AND MASSACHUSETTS

This Part identifies and considers three possible explanations for the
apparent differences between the two decisions: (1) that Justice
Stevens is willing to embrace a less deferential and more active judicial
role in cases involving major social issues, such as global warming; (2)
that Justice Stevens never meant what Chevron has been read to mean
over time; or (3) that Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to
interpretive purposivism dictates that he apply a different analysis to
every statutory scheme to best effectuate Congress’s animating
purposes and goals.84 This Part ultimately concludes that the third
explanation, resting on Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach, is the
most useful in reconciling differences between Massachusetts and
Chevron. This suggests that Justice Stevens will not embrace a more
“active” or more “protective” judicial role simply because a case
presents a major social issue like global warming, but he will pay
particular attention to Congress’s own protective goals and purposes
when reviewing agency action. As such, it seems that he will seek to
ensure that agencies act in a way that furthers Congress’s view of what
will best secure and protect the public interest.
A. Theory One: Major Social Issues Require More Active Judicial
Intervention
One possible explanation for the differences between Chevron and
Massachusetts could simply be that Massachusetts presented a highly
charged, political issue that had major ramifications for global
environmental security.85 Under this theory, perhaps Justice Stevens in
84
A fourth possible explanation worth mentioning might simply be that over
time, Justice Stevens’s style, approach, and views have changed. In other words,
sometime between Chevron being decided in 1984 and Massachusetts being handed
down in 2007, perhaps Justice Stevens’s views on deference and judicial review have
changed. Although this is possible, it seems unlikely to adequately explain the
apparent tension between Chevron and Massachusetts. Justice Stevens, after all, has
spoken publicly about Chevron on multiple occasions, see Merrill, supra note 8, at 420
n.76, and although he has suggested that he did not expect the case to turn into a
blockbuster, see id., he has never suggested that he now disagrees with what he wrote
in the case.
85
Cf. Watts & Wildermuth, supra note 11, at 1043 (“Perhaps the Court’s
willingness to apply such rigorous review is limited to the specifics of this case,
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Massachusetts was willing to ignore Chevron’s rule of deference (or at
least to “soft pedal” Chevron, as one scholar has put it)86 because the
magnitude of the evils of global warming convinced Justice Stevens
that the judiciary had to play an active role in securing the public
interest where the Executive Branch had dragged its heels and failed to
act. In other words, Justice Stevens may have felt that the Executive
Branch had delayed long enough and that it was time for the judiciary
to send a clear message about the need for the executive to address
this major environmental issue.
Articulating a similar take on Massachusetts, Professor Ronald Cass
has argued that the justices in the majority ran roughshod over
administrative law principles, such as Chevron deference, in order to
promote their own political preferences.87 Specifically, Professor Cass
charged that the Justices “stretch[ed], twist[ed], and torture[d]
administrative law doctrines” in their “eagerness to promote
government action.”88 Similarly, in his dissenting opinion in
Massachusetts, Justice Scalia engaged in a related attack, suggesting
that the majority had improperly “substitute[ed] its own desired
outcome for the reasoned judgment of the responsible agency” due to
the importance of the underlying policy issues at stake.89
Although it is certainly possible that Justice Stevens’s concerns
about the tremendous significance of global warming led him to take
on a more active judicial role and to espouse heightened
environmental awareness in Massachusetts, this possibility alone does
not adequately explain the significant differences between
Massachusetts and Chevron. Chevron, after all, also involved a very
significant environmental issue: national air pollution control.90 Yet, as
Professor Kenneth Manaster has pointed out, Chevron, unlike
Massachusetts, “was decided without any direct analysis of the
environmental questions it raised.”91
namely the immense importance of global warming.”).
86
DEVELOPMENTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY PRACTICE 2006-2007, at
xiv (Jeffrey S. Lubbers ed., 2008) (noting that Chevron was “soft-pedaled” in
Massachusetts).
87
See Cass, supra note 12, at 75 (“In their eagerness to promote government
action to address global warming, the Justices stretch, twist, and torture administrative
law doctrines to avoid the inconvenient truth that this is not a matter on which judges
have any real role to play.”).
88
Id.
89
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 560 (2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
90
See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1965 (noting that Chevron involved “issues of
tremendous significance for air pollution control across the country”).
91
See id.
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Furthermore, Justice Stevens repeatedly has made clear that he
avoids deciding cases based on his own policy preferences.92 For
example, in Zuni Public School District No. 89 v. Department of
Education,93 a 2007 case involving the permissibility of the Secretary of
Education’s interpretation of a statute, Justice Stevens stated the
following in response to concerns raised by Justice Scalia that judicial
departures from statutory text might represent policy-driven
interpretations:
Justice Scalia’s argument today rests on the incorrect premise
that every policy-driven interpretation implements a judge’s
personal view of sound policy, rather than a faithful attempt to
carry out the will of the legislature. Quite the contrary is true
of the work of the judges with whom I have worked for many
years. If we presume that our judges are intellectually honest
— as I do — there is no reason to fear “policy-driven
interpretation[s]” of Acts of Congress.94
Obviously, the fact that Justice Stevens repeatedly says in cases like
Zuni that he avoids deciding cases based on his own policy preferences
does not necessarily make the statement true. But there is ample
evidence to support his statements. Professor Manaster, for example,
has thoroughly detailed how Justice Stevens has disappointed
environmentalists by refusing to alter his judicial approach in
environmental cases simply to achieve environmental protection.95
According to Professor Manaster, Justice Stevens routinely approaches

92

See, e.g., Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 107 (2007)
(“The only ‘policy’ by which I have been driven is that which this Court has endorsed
on repeated occasions regarding the importance of remaining faithful to Congress’
intent.”); Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 799 n.8 (2006) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (noting that he was implementing Congress’ policy choices, not his own);
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the
basis of the judges’ personal policy preferences.”); see also Manaster, supra note 28, at
1993 & nn.148-49 (quoting Justice Stevens as saying that he has decided cases as
judge in ways that conflict with his own personal “views as to what would be most
advantageous or desirable in our modern day society”).
93
550 U.S. 81.
94
Id. at 105 (Stevens, J., concurring); see also id. at 107 (“The only ‘policy’ by
which I have been driven is that which this Court has endorsed on repeated occasions
regarding the importance of remaining faithful to Congress’ intent.”).
95
See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1965-66, 2001 (“[W]hen regulatory actions of
environmental and other types of agencies are subjected to judicial review, there is no
reason to expect that Justice Stevens’s emphatic rejection of a policy making role for
judges will be diluted or ignored.”).
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environmental cases through general doctrines of administrative law
and statutory interpretation instead of bending his judicial approach
to protect the environment.96
Specifically, Professor Manaster has pointed to Justice Stevens’s
dissenting opinion in City of Chicago v. Environmental Defense Fund97
as an example of a case in which Justice Stevens might have felt that
what the “law authorized” was “divorced from” his own judgment.98
In City of Chicago, the majority in an opinion by Justice Scalia held
that ash generated by Chicago’s incineration of solid waste was subject
to a scheme governing hazardous waste set up by the Resource
Conservation Recovery Act (“RCRA”). In dissent, Justice Stevens
stated that he would have deferred to the EPA and reached a contrary
conclusion.99 He conceded that “[t]he majority’s decision today may
represent sound policy” because “[r]equiring cities to spend the
necessary funds to dispose of their incinerator residues in accordance
with the strict requirements of [RCRA] will provide additional
protections to the environment.”100 However, he noted that “the
conservation of scarce landfill space and the encouragement of the
recovery of energy and valuable materials in municipal wastes were
major concerns motivating RCRA’s enactment” as well.101 According to
Justice Stevens, it was up to the EPA, not to the Court, to decide
“[w]hether those purposes will be disserved by regulating municipal
incinerators under Subtitle C [of RCRA] and, if so, whether
environmental benefits may nevertheless justify the costs of such
additional regulation.”102
Hence, in light of both Chevron’s and Massachusetts’s involvement in
pressing environmental issues and in light of cases like City of
Chicago, it seems tough to square Massachusetts and Chevron solely by
noting that Massachusetts involved a highly significant environmental
issue. Other possible explanations for the apparent tension between
Chevron and Massachusetts must be explored as well.

96
97
98
99
100
101
102

Id. at 1965-66.
511 U.S. 328 (1994).
See Manaster, supra note 28, at 1993 n.149.
City of Chicago, 511 U.S. at 348 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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B. Theory Two: Justice Stevens Does Not Believe that Chevron Means
What It Has Been Read to Mean
Another possible and perhaps more promising way of explaining the
differences between Massachusetts and Chevron would be to say that
Justice Stevens never meant to say what Chevron has been read to
mean as time has passed. Since being decided in 1984, Chevron
certainly has taken on a life of its own, morphing into a mandatory
rule of deference that legal scholars have read to shift significant
interpretive power from the courts to agencies.103 Chevron’s rule of
deference also has grown in complexity — consisting, for example,
not only of the step one and step two inquiries, but now also of a “step
zero” inquiry, which focuses on whether or not Chevron is applicable
in a certain case and thus operates as a kind of on/off switch for
Chevron deference.104
Justice Stevens, a fan of flexible standards rather than rigid rules,105
has not hidden the fact that he has serious reservations about the
broad, mandatory reading of Chevron that has taken hold over the
years.106 Immediately after the Chevron decision, for example, Justice
Stevens wrote the opinion for the Court in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,107
in which he debated the scope of Chevron with Justice Scalia, a strong
supporter of Chevron deference. Cardoza-Fonseca involved a pure
103
See generally Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 188-89 (“[S]hortly after it
appeared, Chevron was quickly taken to establish a new approach to judicial review of
agency interpretations of law, going so far as to create a kind of counter-Marbury for
the administrative state.”); Watts, Adapting, supra note 23, at 998 (“[T]he Court’s
decision in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council effected a dramatic
reallocation in authority between the branches, shifting significant power from the
judicial branch and handing it over to administrative agencies.”).
104
See Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at 190-91 (discussing step zero inquiry,
which involves question of whether Chevron applies at all); see also Cass, supra note
12, at 81 (noting that Chevron’s development has “enough twists and turns for a
slalom run”).
105
Cf. Norman Dorsen, John Paul Stevens, 1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. xxv, xxvi (stating
that Stevens “eschews bright-line rules in favor of standards that permit judges
adequate discretion to tailor results to nuanced evaluation of facts and
circumstances”); Stevens, Random Recollections, supra note 23, at 270 (noting that in
context of working on committee charged with endorsing rules that would apply to all
statutes including antitrust exemption, his committee ultimately recommended not
bright-line rule or set of rules, “but a recommendation to read each federal regulatory
statute with great care because each provides its own solutions to the specific
problems that Congress confronted”).
106
Cf. Merrill, supra note 8, at 420-21 (describing how Stevens did not desire to
alter status quo when he wrote Chevron); see also Sunstein, Step Zero, supra note 28, at
188 n.2.
107
480 U.S. 421 (1987).
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question of law: whether the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”)
required the Attorney General to use the same or different standards of
proof when evaluating requests for withholding deportation and
requests for asylum.108 In the course of his opinion, Justice Stevens
strongly implied that Chevron deference does not apply broadly to all
questions of statutory ambiguity, but rather applies only where
questions of law application or implementation are involved, as
opposed to pure questions of law.109 Because Justice Stevens viewed
the question whether Congress intended the standards governing
asylum and deportation “to be identical” as a “pure question of
statutory interpretation,” he deemed it a question for the courts, not
the agency, to decide.110 Accordingly, Justice Stevens seems to have
tried to make clear in Cardoza-Fonseca that not all statutory
ambiguities call for Chevron deference to agencies. Rather, Congress
intends some kinds of statutory ambiguities to be resolved by the
courts.
Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in Cardoza-Fonseca in which he
agreed that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to deference
because its interpretation of the relevant standard was “clearly
inconsistent” with the INA.111 Justice Scalia, however, took issue with
Justice Stevens’s attempts to paint Chevron in a narrow light. Justice
Scalia argued that the Court’s discussion of Chevron was “flatly
inconsistent” with the broad rule of deference set forth in Chevron.112
In particular, Justice Scalia contended that the issue in Chevron turned
on a question of “abstract interpretation” (i.e., a pure question of law
involving the meaning of the term “stationary source”) rather than a
question of law application. Hence, according to Justice Scalia,
Chevron cannot be read to embrace the dichotomy between questions
of law application and pure questions of statutory interpretation as
suggested by Justice Stevens.113
108

See id. at 423.
See Merrill, supra note 8, at 421; see also Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 454
(Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that Court “implies that courts may substitute their
interpretation of a statute for that of an agency whenever they face ‘a pure question of
statutory construction for the courts to decide’ ”).
110
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 446. Having concluded that the standards for
withholding deportation and asylum were not the same under the statute and that a
“well-founded fear” statute applied to review requests for asylum, Justice Stevens did
note that it would be up to the agency to give the “well-founded fear” standard
meaning through actual application. Id. at 448.
111
Id. at 453-54 (Scalia, J., concurring).
112
Id.
113
Id. at 454-55. For a detailed discussion of the debate between Justice Scalia and
109
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Despite Justice Scalia’s claim that Chevron applies across the board
regardless of whether a question of law or law application is involved,
Justice Stevens apparently still believes that the dichotomy between
pure questions of law and questions of law application has relevance
in the Chevron context. Most recently, in the 2009 Negusie v. Holder
decision, Justice Stevens wrote a partial concurrence and partial
dissent in which he again expressed his view that pure questions of
statutory “construction” are reserved for the courts to decide, even if
the statute is not entirely clear, whereas questions of statutory
“implementation” or “application” are reserved for agencies.114 Negusie
involved the question whether the so-called “persecutor bar,” which
bars an alien from seeking asylum if he has persecuted others, applies
even if the alien’s involvement in persecution was the product of
coercion or duress.115 According to Justice Stevens, the case’s narrow
question of statutory interpretation was for the Court, not the agency,
to decide.116 He distinguished Chevron as a question of statutory
implementation, noting that “[c]ourts are expert at statutory
construction,
while
agencies
are
expert
at
statutory
implementation.”117 Thus, Justice Stevens again expressed his
discomfort with applying Chevron broadly to all cases involving
agency interpretations of statutory ambiguities, suggesting that courts
should save Chevron deference for agency constructions that turn on
agency policy expertise.
Perhaps Justice Stevens’s clearly articulated desire to cabin rather
than to expand Chevron reveals why in Massachusetts he was willing to
shy away from Chevron’s deferential approach in determining the
meaning of section 202(a)’s use of the word “judgment.”118 By this
account, one could argue that Justice Stevens may have viewed
Massachusetts as presenting a pure question of statutory interpretation

Justice Stevens in Cardoza-Fonseca, see Bernard Schwartz, “Shooting the Piano Player”?
Justice Scalia and Administrative Law, 47 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 46-50 (1995).
114
Negusie v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1159, 1171-73 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting in
part and concurring in part) (“The Chevron framework thus accounts for the different
institutional competencies of agencies and courts: Courts are experts at statutory
construction, while agencies are expert at statutory implementation.”). It is notable
that Justice Breyer, one of the Court’s administrative law experts, joined Justice
Stevens in Negusie.
115
Id. at 1159. Justice Kennedy wrote the opinion for the Court, ultimately holding
that the statute was ambiguous and that the agency’s interpretation was not entitled to
deference because it was based on an erroneous understanding of a court decision. Id.
116
Id. at 1170 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part).
117
Id. at 1171.
118
See supra Part I.B.
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for the courts to decide — namely, whether section 202(a) required
the EPA to make a “judgment” about whether the pollutants pose a
danger, or whether section 202(a) enabled the EPA to decline to make
a “judgment” based on policy considerations.119 If Justice Stevens
viewed the issue in this way, then he may well have felt that
Massachusetts, like Cardoza-Fonseca and Negusie, posed a pure
question of statutory interpretation involving the metes and bounds of
what the agency was legally required to do, not the kind of technical
question of statutory implementation that Chevron raised that called
for deference to the expert agency due to its exercise of policy
expertise.
Although this explanation for why Justice Stevens jumped over
Chevron in his discussion of the “judgment” issue in Massachusetts is
certainly plausible, it does not seem entirely satisfactory because the
EPA in Massachusetts did not engage in pure statutory construction on
the “judgment” issue, but rather seems to have decided a policy
question involving whether the EPA should or should not regulate.
Specifically, the EPA argued that a variety of discretionary, policydriven considerations (such as scientific uncertainty and Presidential
foreign policy initiatives) persuaded it to decline to make a judgment
about whether certain emissions pose a danger.120 In other words, the
EPA did not purport to be engaging in traditional statutory
construction, but rather seems to have been engaged in public
administration aimed at deciding as a policy matter, rather than a legal
matter, whether or not regulation was called for at that particular time.
This kind of public administration would seem to call for the
application of Chevron,121 even under Justice Steven’s approach to
Chevron deference since Justice Stevens views Chevron as being
applicable when an agency renders a construction that implicates its
policy expertise.122
119

See 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006); see also supra Part I.B.
See supra Part I.B.
121
If Justice Stevens had applied Chevron to the “judgment” issue, it seems that the
relevant questions under Chevron would have been: (1) whether Congress
unambiguously stated which factors the EPA could consider in deciding whether to
make a “judgment,” and (2) if not, whether the EPA’s interpretation of the factors that
it could consider was reasonable. Cf. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 551-53
(2006) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Chevron’s applicability).
122
In Negusie, for example, Justice Stevens explained that deference had been
warranted in Chevron because Chevron did not involve a pure question of statutory
construction. There, the EPA “cast its activity not as statutory construction but as
public administration; its rulemaking sought to achieve policy goals, such as reducing
regulatory complexity and promoting plant modernization.” Negusie, 129 S. Ct. at
120
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Indeed, in another case decided in 2009, Entergy Corp. v.
Riverkeeper, Inc.,123 Justice Stevens seemed to concede that Chevron’s
two-step framework was relevant to determining what factors govern
an agency’s regulatory approach when Congress is silent.124 In Entergy,
the Justices divided in a case involving a CWA provision directing the
EPA to require that certain water intake structures “reflect the best
technology available for minimizing adverse environmental impact.”125
The relevant statutory provision said nothing express about whether
“cost” was a relevant factor that the EPA could consider in making
decisions. Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia read Congress’s silence
about the propriety of considering “cost” to mean that the EPA,
relying upon Chevron deference, could reasonably conclude that a
cost-benefit analysis was an appropriate decisional factor. Specifically,
Justice Scalia explained that he read Congress’s silence in the relevant
statute “to convey nothing more than a refusal to tie the agency’s
hands as to whether cost-benefit analysis should be used, and if so to
what degree.”126
In contrast, Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter and Justice
Ginsburg in dissent, contended that the provision’s silence about the
relevance of cost should not be read “as an implicit source of costbenefit authority, particularly when such authority is elsewhere
expressly granted” in other statutory provisions.127 In arguing that
Congress actually “intend[ed] to control, not delegate when costbenefit analysis” could be used,128 Justice Stevens took issue with
Justice Scalia’s failure to consider, at step one of Chevron, the
possibility that Congress’s silence was meant to foreclose a cost-benefit
analysis.129 However, he did not appear to take issue with Chevron’s
applicability in Entergy. In other words, he did not suggest that the
case presented an issue of pure statutory “construction” to which
Chevron was wholly inapplicable. Rather, he affirmatively cited
Chevron, and he seems to have decided the case at step one of Chevron,
ultimately reaching a different conclusion than Justice Scalia about the
clarity of Congress’s intent.130
1171 n.1 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
123
129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
124
Id. at 1518 & n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
125
See id. at 1516; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006).
126
Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1508.
127
Id. at 1517 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
128
Id. at 1518.
129
Id. at 1518 n.5.
130
Id. at 1518.
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Given that Massachusetts presented the very same kind of issue as
Entergy (namely, the question of what factors the EPA can consider in
administering a statute that is silent about relevant decisional factors),
Justice Stevens’s implicit acceptance of Chevron’s framework in Entergy
could be read to suggest that he likewise should have applied Chevron
in Massachusetts with respect to the “judgment” issue. And yet he did
not. Hence, it does not seem entirely satisfying to say that his
willingness to skip over Chevron’s framework in Massachusetts with
respect to the “judgment” issue can be easily explained simply by
pointing to his overall desire to limit Chevron to those cases that turn
on questions of statutory application rather than statutory
interpretation.
C. Theory Three: Every Statutory Scheme Requires a Different Analysis
Designed to Effectuate Congress’s Unique Purposes and Goals
A third way to reconcile Justice Stevens’s opinions in Massachusetts
and Chevron is to consider Justice Stevens’s strong commitment to
purposivism — meaning his adherence to a method of statutory
interpretation that calls on judges to determine a statute’s original
purpose and to interpret the statute in light of that purpose.131 Justice
Stevens currently stands as one of the Court’s most staunch
proponents of using a purposivist interpretive method of statutory
construction.132 As Professor John Manning has put it, purposivists,
like Justice Stevens and Justice Breyer, believe “that legislation is a
purposive act, and that judges should interpret acts of Congress to
implement the legislative purpose, even if doing so requires some
deviation from the semantic detail of the enacted text.”133 The
purposivist approach is typically contrasted with textualism, which
“gives precedence to a statute’s semantic meaning, when clear, and
eschews reliance on legislative history or other indicia of background

131
See generally Bradford C. Mank, Is a Textualist Approach to Statutory
Interpretation Pro-Environmentalist?: Why Pragmatic Agency Decisionmaking Is Better
than Judicial Literalism, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1231, 1235 (1996) (“[P]urposivists go
beyond the legislature’s original intent to estimate the statute’s spirit or purpose
because either it may be difficult to determine the statute’s original intent or a court
must apply a statute to circumstances that the enacting legislature did not foresee.”).
132
See supra note 15. Justice Breyer is another strong supporter of purposivism.
See, e.g., Fla. Dep’t of Revenue v. Piccadilly Cafeterias, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2326, 2342-43
(2008) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
133
See Manning, supra note 15, at 2009-10 (“For Justice Stevens, respect for
Congress means fidelity to that purpose rather than to the often-faulty semantic
details of whatever text it happened to adopt.”).
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purpose to vary the conventional meaning of the text.”134 Textualists,
like Justice Scalia, criticize purposivism’s attempt to find the collective
intent or purpose of the legislature because “legislatures usually have
no determinate collective expectations about many (if any) of the
concrete issues posed by their statutes.”135
Despite recent momentum in favor of textualism (including Justice
Scalia’s elevation from the D.C. Circuit to the Supreme Court in
1986), Justice Stevens remains highly committed to purposivism.136 As
a longstanding champion of purposivism, Justice Stevens seeks to
interpret statutes to implement Congress’s original purposes and
goals.137 Justice Stevens’s seemingly divergent opinions in
Massachusetts and Chevron, accordingly, might be explained by
considering the simple fact that the cases involved different provisions
of the CAA, each with its own history and its own animating
congressional purposes.
In Chevron, Justice Stevens made clear that Congress was driven by
two competing purposes when it enacted the amendments containing
the permit program at issue in the case: the economic interest in
permitting capital improvements to continue and the environmental
interest in improving air quality.138 Because Congress did not clearly
answer how these competing interests should be balanced, and
because the EPA reached a result that sought to navigate these two
competing interests,139 Justice Stevens, as a purposivist, seems to have
134

Id. at 2010.
William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 642
(1990). Because Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens adhere to very different interpretive
methods, they often disagree when it comes to cases raising questions of statutory
interpretation. See generally Robin Kundis Craig, The Stevens/Scalia Principle and Why
It Matters: Statutory Conversations and a Cultural Critical Critique of the Strict Plain
Meaning Approach, 79 TUL. L. REV. 955 (2005) (comparing approaches of Justices
Stevens and Scalia).
136
This Article does not seek to take a position on the advantages or disadvantages
of purposivism vis-à-vis textualism. That debate has received thorough attention
elsewhere. See, e.g., Eskridge, supra note 135 (discussing traditional approach to
statutory interpretation, as well as describing “new textualism” approach embraced by
Scalia); Manning, supra note 15 (contrasting Scalia’s textualist approach and Stevens’s
purposivist approach). Rather, this Article seeks to analyze how Justice Stevens’s
commitment to purposivism might help to reconcile his opinions in Chevron and
Massachusetts and what, if anything, his commitment to purposivism says about his
view of the proper judicial role in cases impacting the public’s health, welfare, and
safety.
137
See Manning, supra note 15, at 2009; see also Greene, supra note 15, at 1913.
138
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 851-52
(1984).
139
Id. at 865.
135
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felt comfortable deferring to the agency and taking a hands-off judicial
role. In other words, deference seemed appropriate to him because the
EPA’s “interpretation represent[ed] a reasonable accommodation” of
the “manifestly competing interests” that Congress had in mind when
creating the permit program.140
In contrast, in Massachusetts, although Justice Stevens focused
rather narrowly (and perhaps uncharacteristically) on the statute’s text
instead of on section 202(a)’s general purposes, one can tease out of his
opinion a general concern for furthering the statute’s main protective
purpose: protection from harm resulting from air pollutants. For
example, Justice Stevens was unconcerned that Congress “might not
have appreciated the possibility that burning fossil fuels could lead to
global warming” because he concluded that Congress had used broad
language in the statute in order to confer the “flexibility” needed to
ensure that “changing circumstances and scientific developments”
would not render the CAA obsolete.141 In other words, Justice Stevens
seems to have believed that Congress drafted section 202(a)(1) with
some breadth in order to ensure that the CAA’s spirit would be served
even as circumstances changed and new developments occurred.142
Viewed in this light, it seems that what bothered Justice Stevens about
the EPA’s reading of the term “air pollutant” in section 202(a) was
that it was too narrow and too cramped given the overarching
statutory purpose.143 Accordingly, Justice Stevens may have felt
comfortable interpreting the statutory term “air pollutant” in a way
that would ensure that the EPA could not undermine Congress’s
protective purpose of ensuring that the public health and welfare are
protected.144
Similarly, Justice Stevens’s nondeferential treatment of the other
merits issue in Massachusetts — namely, whether the EPA had the
statutory authority to decline to make a judgment based on policy
considerations — also makes sense when considered in light of his
purposivist leanings. Imagine that Justice Stevens had read section
202(a) to allow the EPA to rely upon policy reasons wholly
unconnected to the statute in declining to make a judgment about
140
Id. (“Congress intended to accommodate both interests, but did not do so itself
on the level of specificity presented by these cases.”).
141
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 532 (2007).
142
Id.
143
Id. (noting that EPA has been charged with protecting public’s “health” and
“welfare” and discussing how Congress used capacious terms to ensure that Act would
have regulatory flexibility to handle changing circumstances and scientific
developments).
144
See id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
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whether or not carbon dioxide emissions endanger the public health
and welfare. If he had adopted such an expansive reading of the
statute, then the EPA might fairly easily have been able to forever
postpone making the endangerment judgment foreseen by section
202(a). In this sense, as Professors Jody Freeman and Adrian
Vermeule have aptly explained, the EPA might have been able to
“circumvent” the statutory provision’s very purpose of ensuring that
the EPA actually makes judgments about the health and welfare effects
of air pollutants.145 From the perspective of a purposivist who is
concerned with interpreting statutes in ways that will effectuate
Congress’s main goals, one can see why Justice Stevens would not
have been eager to read section 202(a) to allow this result. According
to Professors Freeman and Vermeule, a purposivist might think it
“absurd for the statute to require strong, and tightly constrained, firstorder judgment about pollution’s effects on health and welfare while
conferring unbounded discretion on EPA to decide never to make
such judgments.”146
Hence, under this view, it seems likely that Chevron and
Massachusetts reach different results, strike different tones, and send
different messages about the judicial role simply because they involved
different provisions of the CAA that were motivated by different
congressional purposes. In Chevron, Congress had not definitively
resolved how the struggle between two competing interests should be
reconciled, so Justice Stevens embraced a narrow, highly deferential
judicial role to allow the EPA, rather than an unelected judiciary, to
resolve the struggle between competing interests.147 In contrast, in
Massachusetts, Justice Stevens may have believed that Congress’s basic
goal embodied in the relevant statutory provision was clear: to protect
the public health and welfare from air pollutants.148 Justice Stevens,
accordingly, may not have seen a need in Massachusetts to defer to the
145
See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 85 (arguing that Justice Stevens’s
opinion in Massachusetts might be explained by “anticircumvention principle,” which
calls on courts to interpret statutes “so as not to allow circumvention of a statute’s
main provisions”). Professor Jack Beermann has reached a similar conclusion, arguing
that the Court in Massachusetts — even though it may have gotten it wrong — “was
doing its best to work with Congress to achieve the congressional goals embodied in
the statute rather than advance an agenda unrelated to those policies.” Jack M.
Beermann, The Turn Toward Congress in Administrative Law, 89 B.U. L. REV. 727, 742
(2009).
146
See Freeman & Vermeule, supra note 77, at 86.
147
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S 837, 859-63
(1984).
148
Cf. Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 528 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1)).

2010]

From Chevron to Massachusetts

1053

EPA, which adopted a statutory construction that flouted Congress’s
main purpose.
Put another way, Justice Stevens seems to have concluded that the
EPA in Massachusetts was essentially thumbing its nose at Congress’s
protective goals and hence had to lose at step one of Chevron. By
contrast, the EPA in Chevron was doing its best to reconcile two
competing interests contemplated but not resolved by Congress and
hence deserved deference at step two of Chevron.149
III. A PROTECTOR OF CONGRESS’S VIEW OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
The picture just painted of how Massachusetts and Chevron can be
reconciled suggests that Justice Stevens cannot accurately be labeled as
the proponent of an active, protective judiciary (à la Massachusetts) or
a highly deferential, hands-off judiciary (à la Chevron). Rather, as a
strong purposivist, he strives to ensure that agencies act to effectuate
Congress’s own animating purposes. In doing so, however, many of
Justice Stevens’s decisions seem to pay particularly close attention to
protective and remedial purposes set by Congress. As a result,
although Justice Stevens expressly eschews deciding cases based on his
own policy preferences, his purposivist approach to statutory
interpretation does seem to enable him to give agencies the leeway
they need to facilitate broad protective or remedial goals set by
Congress,150 and conversely to check agencies when they act counter
to Congress’s overarching protective or remedial purposes.151

149

See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing two competing purposes).
Cf. Diane L. Hughes, Note, Justice Stevens’s Method of Statutory Interpretation: A
Well-Tailored Means for Facilitating Environmental Regulation, 19 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV.
493, 497 (1995) (arguing that “Justice Stevens’s method of statutory analysis in the
environmental context is superior to rigid textualism in satisfying the purposes of
environmental regulation”).
151
In this sense, the conclusions reached here might help to explain Professor
William Eskridge and Lauren Baer’s recent finding that Justice Stevens is the third
least deferential justice of 17 recent justices they studied. See William N. Eskridge &
Lauren Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1154 (2008). As Professor
Eskridge and Baer noted, it is a bit ironic that the very author of Chevron stands as the
“third least deferential justice,” id., but they hint that Justice Stevens’s failure to
consistently defer might be explained by his “general philosophy of strictly enforcing
congressional expectations and constitutional norms against agencies.” Id.
150

1054

University of California, Davis

[Vol. 43:1021

A. Reading Congressional Purposes and Remedial Goals Broadly
Some specific examples should easily demonstrate Justice Stevens’s
willingness to read protective or remedial congressional purposes
broadly in the context of reviewing agency action. Consider, for
example, Justice Stevens’s dissent in Solid Waste Agency of Northern
Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (SWANCC), a 2001
decision involving whether the Army Corps of Engineers could
exercise jurisdiction under the CWA over abandoned sand and gravel
pits that provide habitat for migratory birds.152 In an opinion by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Court read the Corps’ jurisdiction narrowly and
refused to extend the Corps’ jurisdiction to areas not adjacent to
navigable water.153 In reaching this conclusion, the Court mentioned
that Congress passed the CWA “for the stated purpose of ‘restor[ing]
and maintain[ing] the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of
the Nation’s waters.’ ”154 Yet as one commentator has pointed out, the
Court ultimately “gave little interpretive weight to the CWA’s broad
remedial purpose.”155
In contrast, in his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens (joined by
Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer) looked to Congress’s animating
remedial purpose and argued for a broad reading of the CWA, noting
that Congress sought to protect “the quality of our Nation’s waters for
esthetic, health, recreational, and environmental uses.”156 Justice
Stevens also noted that the “major purpose” of the CWA was “to
establish a comprehensive long-range policy for the elimination of
water pollution.”157 Citing Chevron, Justice Stevens ultimately
concluded that the “Corps’ interpretation of the statute as extending
beyond navigable waters, tributaries of navigable waters, and wetlands
adjacent each is manifestly reasonable and therefore entitled to
deference.”158 According to Justice Stevens, the majority, in reaching a
contrary conclusion, had “needlessly weaken[ed] our principal

152
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs
(SWANCC), 531 U.S. 159, 162-63 (2001).
153
Id. at 168.
154
Id. at 166 (quoting 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000)).
155
Courtney Covington, Note, Rapanos v. United States: Evaluating the Efficacy of
Textualism in Interpreting Environmental Laws, 34 ECOLOGY L.Q. 801, 809 (2007).
156
See SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175, 180 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Covington,
supra note 155, at 810 (“Stevens’ willingness to consider Congressional purpose and
intent allowed him to conclude that an interpretation of the Corps’ jurisdiction that
covers the ponds at issue in SWANCC is consistent with the CWA.”).
157
SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 179 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
158
Id. at 192.
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safeguard against toxic water” and had done violence to Congress’s
chosen protective scheme.159
Another useful example of Justice Stevens’s willingness to read
protective statutes broadly (and to respect agencies’ protective
readings of such statutes) can be found in Justice Stevens’s dissenting
opinion in Rapanos v. United States, a 2006 case that asked whether the
CWA’s protections extended to certain wetlands.160 A plurality of the
Court led by Justice Scalia, following a textualist approach, read the
CWA narrowly, concluding that the Corps’s expansive interpretation
of the phrase “waters of the United States” is not based on a
permissible construction of the statute and hence did not merit
Chevron deference.161 In contrast, Justice Stevens (joined again by
Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter) dissented by stating that the
Army Corps’ determination that certain wetlands are encompassed
within the CWA was reasonable and hence called for Chevron
deference. Specifically, Justice Stevens concluded that “[t]he
Corps’ . . . decision to treat these wetlands as encompassed within the
term ‘waters of the United States’ is a quintessential example of the
Executive’s reasonable interpretation of a statutory provision.”162
Justice Stevens acknowledged in Rapanos that his ultimate
conclusion was influenced by policy considerations, but he made clear
that the pro-environmental “policy considerations” that influenced his
thinking were “Congress’ rather than his own.”163 Specifically, Justice
Stevens stated that he sought to effectuate Congress’s broad goal of
“protecting the physical, chemical and biological integrity of our
waters.”164 Hence, Justice Scalia’s textualist approach served to
constrain the CWA, whereas Justice Stevens’s purposivist approach
enabled him to read Congress’s protective goals and purposes broadly
so that he could defer to the agency’s reasonable reading of the
statute.165 Justice Stevens’s approach, accordingly, sought to enable the
159

Id. at 175 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also id. at 191 (arguing that it is
“majority’s reading, not the agency’s, that does violence to the scheme Congress chose
to put into place”).
160
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 719-20 (2006).
161
Id. at 716 (plurality opinion) (Scalia, J., joined by Roberts, C.J., and Thomas &
Alito, JJ.).
162
Id. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def.
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45 (1984)).
163
Id. at 798 n.8.
164
Id. He then cited Chevron for the proposition that Congress’s policy concerns
are relevant to determining whether the agency regulation is permissible. See id.
165
See Covington, supra note 155, at 817-33 (arguing that Justice Scalia’s textualist
approach serves to constrain CWA in way that undermines its main purpose).
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agency to resolve any ambiguity in the statute in favor of the
environmental interests that the statute was designed to protect.
Yet another helpful example of how Justice Stevens’s purposivist
approach enables him to give particular attention to Congress’s broad
protective purposes is his opinion in Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Communities for a Greater Oregon, a 1995 decision involving the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”).166 The issue was whether the
Secretary of the Interior exceeded his authority under the ESA in
promulgating a regulation that defined the statute’s prohibition on
takings to include “significant habitat modification or degradation
where it actually kills or injures wildlife.”167 In upholding the
regulation’s broad definition of the ESA’s prohibition on “taking”
endangered or threatened species, Justice Stevens relied in part on
what he labeled the “broad purpose” of the ESA: “[T]he broad purpose
of the ESA supports the Secretary’s decision to extend protection
against activities that cause the precise harms Congress enacted the
statute to avoid.”168 He noted that among the central purposes of the
ESA was “to provide a means whereby the ecosystems upon which
endangered species and threatened species depend may be
conserved,”169 and he highlighted the Court’s previous description of
the ESA as “the most comprehensive legislation for the preservation of
endangered species ever enacted by any nation.”170 In light of
“Congress’ clear expression of the ESA’s broad purpose to protect
endangered and threatened wildlife,” Justice Stevens concluded that
the Secretary’s broad definition was “reasonable” and warranted
deference.171
A final illustrative example of Justice Stevens’s willingness to draw
on Congress’s own broad protective purposes is his dissenting opinion
in Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., a case involving the question
whether myopic job applicants were disabled within the meaning of
the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).172 Each of the three
executive agencies charged with administering the ADA had
concluded that it mandates that “the presence of disability turns on an
166
Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698
(1995).
167
Id. at 690.
168
Id. at 698.
169
Id. (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1994)).
170
Id. (quoting TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978)).
171
Id. at 700. Justice Scalia wrote a dissenting opinion in the case joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas in which he took a textualist approach. Id. at
717 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
172
See Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475-77 (1999).
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individual’s uncorrected state.”173 Yet the majority, in an opinion
written by Justice O’Connor, held that myopic applicants were not
disabled under the ADA because the applicants could correct their
visual impairment with corrective lenses.174 Arguing in dissent that the
job applicants should be entitled to the ADA’s protections, Justice
Stevens, joined by Justice Breyer, stressed that the Court’s task should
be to interpret the statute in light of the purposes Congress sought to
serve.175 Congress’s central purpose in the ADA was clear to Justice
Stevens: Congress meant the ADA “to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities.”176 In order to be faithful to the
ADA’s remedial purpose, Justice Stevens argued that the Court should
give the ADA “a generous, rather than a miserly, construction.”177
As these various examples illustrate, if an agency reads a statute
narrowly despite Congress’s broad protective or remedial goals, then
Justice Stevens may well refuse to defer to the agency’s views.
Massachusetts serves as a prime example of where this occurred within
the confines of step one of Chevron: the agency’s claim to Chevron
deference lost out to Justice Stevens’s fidelity to the CAA’s text, as well
as its protective goals and purposes.178 Conversely, if an agency adopts
an expansive statutory reading that helps to further Congress’s own
broad protective or remedial purposes, then Justice Stevens appears
likely to give deference to the agency’s reasonable views — as he did,
for example, in his dissenting opinions in SWANCC, Rapanos, and
Sutton and in his majority opinion in Babbitt.
B. The Remedial Purpose Canon
In seeking to ensure that administrative agencies implementing
Congress’s statutory schemes respect Congress’s broad protective or
remedial purposes, Justice Stevens’s purposivist interpretive approach
overlaps significantly with the so-called remedial purpose canon. The
remedial purpose canon, which serves as a tool of statutory
construction, calls upon courts to construe protective or remedial
statutes broadly to effectuate their animating purposes.179 Although it
173

Id. at 501 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 488-89 (majority opinion).
175
Id. at 504-05 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
176
Id. at 497 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1) (1994)).
177
Id. at 495.
178
Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 500-01 (2007).
179
See generally Watson, supra note 16 (providing general discussion of remedial
purpose canon).
174
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has been the subject of much criticism and debate,180 the canon has
been invoked in a wide range of cases covering topics such as
workplace safety, public health, discrimination, and securities.181
Often, it plays a role in cases that involve safety legislation, such as the
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act.182 In 1943, for example, in
United States v. Dotterweich, Justice Frankfurter noted that the
purposes of the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act touch phases of
the lives and health of people which, in the circumstances of modern
industrialism, are largely beyond self-protection.”183 Implicitly
invoking the remedial purpose canon, Justice Frankfurter noted that
“[r]egard for these purposes should infuse construction of the
legislation if it is to be treated as a working instruction of government
and not merely as a collection of English words.”184
Similarly, in 2000 in FDA v. Brown & Williamson — an opinion
holding that the FDA lacked the statutory authority to regulate
tobacco — Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Stevens implicitly invoked the remedial purpose canon in arguing that
the statute should be read to allow the FDA to regulate tobacco.185
Specifically, Justice Breyer argued that the “statute’s basic purpose —
the protection of public health — supports the inclusion of cigarettes
within its scope.”186

180
See id. at 266-69 (discussing how debate surrounding canon has “heated up” in
recent years).
181
Id. at 201.
182
For some examples of opinions that invoke the remedial purpose canon either
explicitly or implicitly to liberally construe congressional statutes to effectuate
remedial or protective purposes, see, for example, Whirlpool v. Marshall, 445 U.S. 1,
13 (1980) (“[S]afety legislation is to be liberally construed to effectuate the
congressional purpose.”); United States v. Bacto-Unidisk, 394 U.S. 784, 798 (1969)
(noting that there is “well-accepted principle that remedial legislation such as the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act is to be given a liberal construction consistent with the
Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public health”); Nutritional Health Alliance v.
FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 98 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[W]hen we are dealing with the public health,
the language of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act should not be read too restrictively,
but rather as ‘consistent with the Act’s overriding purpose to protect the public
health.’ ”) (internal citations omitted).
183
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277, 280 (1943).
184
Id.
185
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 162 (2000) (Breyer,
J., dissenting). For the proposition that the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act “is to be
given a liberal construction consistent with [its] overriding purpose to protect the
public health,” Justice Breyer cited United States v. Article of Drug Bacto-Unidisk, 394
U.S. 784, 798 (1969).
186
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. at 162.
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Although only some of Justice Stevens’s opinions consciously cite
the remedial purpose canon,187 the canon seems to be operating in the
background of many of Justice Stevens’s opinions to the extent that he
reads statutes broadly rather than narrowly in order to effectuate what
he perceives to be Congress’s remedial or protective goals.188 In
particular, he often appears willing to read statutes impacting the
public’s security, safety, and welfare (such as environmental laws,
anti-discrimination statutes, and safety legislation) generously rather
than narrowly in order to effectuate their overriding purposes. This
means that when agency action serves the central protective purposes
of a statute, Justice Stevens seems likely to view judicial deference at
Chevron step two as being particularly appropriate because such
deference ensures that the agency is given the leeway it needs to serve
the broad protective goals of the statute.189 Conversely, if an agency
adopts a narrow reading of a remedial or protective statute that the
agency administers (as the EPA arguably did in Massachusetts), then
Justice Stevens may well refuse to defer to the agency, finding the
statute to be clear at step one.
This kind of reliance on the remedial purpose canon, of course, is
subject to attack on different fronts. One could argue, for example,
that Justice Stevens’s implicit reliance on the remedial purpose canon
is vulnerable to the charge that he is discerning broad congressional
purposes and reading statutes broadly not because he is truly seeking
to advance Congress’s own goals and purposes, but rather because he
is sympathetic to the underlying remedial goals of the statutes.190
Justice Scalia would likely be one to make this kind of a charge. He
187
See, e.g., SEC v. Zandford, 535 U.S. 813, 819 (2002) (“[W]e have explained that
the [Securities Exchange Act] should be construed ‘not technically and restrictively,
but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes.’ ”); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc.,
527 U.S. 471, 504 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It has long been a ‘familiar canon
of statutory construction that remedial legislation should be construed broadly to
effectuate its purposes.’ ”).
188
See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 788 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (SWANCC), 531
U.S. 159, 175-80 (2001) (Stevens, J., dissenting); Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of
Cmtys. for a Greater Or., 515 U.S. 687, 704-05 (1995).
189
See Rapanos, 547 U.S. at 788 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Zandford, 535 U.S. at 820,
821-22; SWANCC, 531 U.S. at 175-80 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Babbitt, 515 U.S. 687,
704-05.
190
Cf. Jonathan Z. Cannon, Words and Worlds: The Supreme Court in Rapanos and
Carabell, 25 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 277, 309 (2007) (“Justices sympathetic to the remedial
goals of these statutes (e.g., restoring and protecting the integrity of ecosystems) will
also be Justices who opt for intentionalists’ emphasis on legislative purpose and
standard-like interpretations to facilitate full expression of these goals.”).
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has attacked the remedial purpose canon in the past, arguing that it is
“wonderfully indeterminate” because “no one knows what a ‘remedial
statute’ is” and “no one knows how liberal is a liberal construction.”191
Specifically, Justice Scalia has charged that judges use (or refrain from
using) the canon depending on whether it will assist “in reaching the
result the court wishes to achieve.”192 Others have levied similar
charges against the canon, suggesting that it can be used as a “tool of
manipulation wielded by judges desirous of cloaking judicial
willfulness in formalistic verbiage.”193
If directed at Justice Stevens, however, such criticism seems
misdirected in light of various Stevens decisions that suggest that he
will not reject any and all agency constructions that undercut
protective or remedial values. Nor will he simply rubber stamp any
and all agencies constructions that reach broad, protective results.
Take Chevron itself, for example. There, Justice Stevens ultimately
made no reference to the remedial purpose canon in his opinion even
though the environmental groups challenging the EPA’s “bubble
concept” argued in their brief to the Court that rejecting the EPA’s
reading was consistent with “settled principles for construing a
remedial statute which seeks to protect public health from hazards
over which people have no personal control.”194 In fact, after taking
into account the two competing interests that Congress sought to
accommodate, Justice Stevens ultimately deferred to the EPA despite
environmentalists’ claims that the EPA’s reading would fail to improve
air quality.195
Another example can be found in Justice Stevens’s opinion for the
Court in Potomac Electric Power Co. v. Director, Office of Workers
Compensation Programs.196 There, Justice Stevens rejected an argument
that the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act
(“LHWCA”) should be read broadly, consistent with the remedial
purpose canon, to provide a complete and adequate remedy to an
injured employee. He noted that implicit in this argument was the
incorrect “assumption that the sole purpose of the Act was to provide
191
Antonin Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE WEST.
RES. L. REV. 581, 586 (1990).
192
Id.
193
Watson, supra note 16, at 267 (summarizing criticism aimed at remedial
purpose canon).
194
See id. at 259 n.253 (citing Respondents’ Brief at 38-39, Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v.
Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (No. 82-1005)).
195
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat’l Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866
(1984); see also supra Part I.A.
196
449 U.S. 268 (1980).
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disabled workers with a complete remedy for their industrial
injuries.”197 Specifically, he noted that the LHWCA “represents a
compromise between the competing interests of disabled laborers and
their employers.”198
Similarly, in Stearns Electric Paste Co. v. EPA,199 Justice Stevens (then
a judge sitting on the Seventh Circuit) reached a result that diverges
from what would have been most protective of the public’s health. In
Stearns, then-Judge Stevens was faced with deciding whether the EPA
had acted improperly in determining that a rat poison — which had
killed and led to the hospitalization of both adults and children — was
“misbranded” within the meaning of the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (“FIFRA”) when subjected to “willful
misuse.”200 Despite the protective goals of FIFRA, then-Judge Stevens
concluded that there was “no statutory support” for application of the
Act’s “misbranding” standard to “misuse” of a product.201 In reaching
this conclusion, he quoted Justice Frankfurter for the following
proposition: “In our anxiety to effectuate the congressional purpose of
protecting the public, we must take care not to extend the scope of the
statute beyond the point where Congress indicated it would stop.”202
Hence, as Stearns illustrates, Justice Stevens clearly recognizes that
there are limits to how liberally the protective aims of a statute can be
read and to how much leeway agencies can be given to achieve
protective aims.
CONCLUSION
The picture of Justice Stevens that should emerge from this Article is
that of a justice whose purposivist interpretive method enables him to
give deference to agency interpretations that resolve ambiguities in
favor of protective statutory purposes and conversely to refuse to defer
to narrow agency constructions where doing so would undermine the

197

Id. at 280-81.
Id. at 282.
199
461 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1972).
200
Id. at 296, 308.
201
Id. at 307 (“Although it is consistent with the statutory language and purpose to
apply a substantive standard of product safety to the use of a product in compliance
with its manufacturer’s directions, there is no statutory support for the application of
that standard to misuse of a product. Without such support, the formulation of
substantive standards of product safety by an administrative agency expands the scope
of administrative discretion beyond permissible limits.”).
202
Id. at 309 n.52 (quoting 62 Cases More or Less, Each Containing Six Jars of Jam
v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 600 (1951)).
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protective or remedial design of a statute.203 This means that Justice
Stevens’s opinions, such as his landmark global warming decision in
Massachusetts, often support results that might be viewed as “liberal”
in the sense that they serve to protect the public’s health, safety,
security, and welfare.204 But this does not appear to be because he is
imposing his own view of wise policy or his own view of what would
best protect the public interest. Instead, he recognizes the limits of
advancing the public interest within the confines of statutory
constraints, and he appears to be considering Congress’s animating
goals and seeking to ensure that agencies act in ways that further
rather than undercut Congress’s own remedial and protective goals.
Justice Stevens’s opinion in Massachusetts, accordingly, ought not be
viewed as his Chevron opinion “turned inside out.”205 Rather, when
viewed alongside other Stevens opinions, Massachusetts and Chevron
nicely illustrate Justice Stevens’s longstanding commitment to
purposivism.

203
Opinions from the Second Circuit — relying in part on Supreme Court
precedents — have embraced a very similar approach in cases involving the Food,
Drug and Cosmetic Act. See, e.g., Nutritional Health Alliance v. FDA, 318 F.3d 92, 98
(2003) (“[W]hen agency rulemaking serves the purposes of the statute, courts should
refuse to adopt a narrow construction of the enabling legislation which would
undercut the agency’s authority to promulgate such rules . . . .” (quoting United States
v. Nova Scotia Food Prods., 568 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1977))).
204
Cf. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 151, at 1153-54 n.191 & Table 20 (finding in
study of 1,014 statutory cases that Justice Stevens supported agency decisions coded
as liberal 79.2 percent of the time and supported agency interpretations coded as
conservative 49.6 percent of the time).
205
Cass, supra note 12, at 84.

